Chapter 40 – Mustafa

Edward Erickson states in Gallipoli: The Ottoman Campaign , that “…about 5.30am, Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal alerted his 19th Division for action and ordered his cavalry troop forward to conduct route reconnaissance of the roads to Koja Chemen Tepe.” Harvey Broadbent refers to mounted reconnaissance patrols being sent to the Kabatepe area and the Suvla Bay area ( Gallipoli-The Turkish Defence p.74).

Mustafa Kemal’s chief of staff, Major Izzettin was involved in mobilising 19th Division troops at Boghali early in the morning of 25 April. Some quotes from his memoirs and his written orders are translated from the Turkish archives by Harvey Broadbent in Gallipoli – The Turkish Defence (pp. 71-72, 75-76)

In 1905, while training in Syria, Mustafa Kemal was involved in establishing a political clandestine society called “Fatherland and Freedom” (Andrew Mango, Ataturk , p. 61). It would seem likely that in 1915 he would still think of Turkey as the Fatherland.

Harvey Broadbent states in his reference text Gallipoli – The Turkish Defence (p. 72) that Mustafa Kemal had been on alert and prepared since just after 0510 and exercising the 57th Regiment. The order requesting Mustafa Kemal to send one battalion is quoted (translated into English) on p. 74:

“The Enemy is extending from the Ariburnu ridges to the ridges behind Kaba Tepe. It is requested that you, being closest, dispatch of one battalion from your forces at Maltepe against Ariburnu to the north of Kaba Tepe without delay and report its results.”

Many historical accounts note that on 25 April, Lieutenant-Colonel Mustafa Kemal decided to commit the 57th Regiment (and subsequently his full 19th Division) on his own initiative, in the absence of any orders. However, 9th Division commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Halil Sami sent a request to Mustafa Kemal to commit one battalion to the defence of the Ari Burnu (Anzac) area at 6:30am. This is described in Harvey Broadbent’s Defending Gallipoli – The Turkish Story , p. 44-46. This account also states that telephone connection problems hampered communications, and confirms that Mustafa Kemal did not know about the Cape Helles landings at this time.

Australian official historian Charles Bean first learned of the significance of Mustafa Kemal’s initiative in 1919 a post-war interview with Major Zeki Bey, commander of the 1st Battalion, 57th Regiment. This account is provided in Gallipoli Mission , p. 133-136.

Mesut Ayur in The Ottoman Defence Against the ANZAC Landing: 25 April 1915 (p. 62-70) describes how Mustafa worked with the commander of the 27th Regiment (Major Mehmed Shefik) in maintaining defensive preparations (including artillery) against a landing in the Ari Burnu (Anzac Cove) area. The 27th Regiment was well established in this area when it came under Mustafa Kemal’s command on 26 February 1915. However, on 25th March 1915, Mustafa Kemal’s 19th Division became the corps reserve, and command of the 27th Regiment was returned to the 9th Division. Ayur also includes a discussion about the conflicting reports on the timing of Mustafa Kemal’s counter attack on the morning of 25 April 1915 (Appendix 6, pp. 175-177).

Mustafa Kemal telephoned III Corps commander Esat Pasha at Bolayir shortly after 5:30am, but could not get any orders to deploy his 19th Division. Esat was unwilling to commit to a decision without consulting with Field Marshal von Sanders, however, von Sanders was out in the field observing the enemy ships and could not be contacted. A description is provided by Harvey Broadbent in Defending Gallipoli – The Turkish Story , p. 44-46 and in Gallipoli – The Turkish Defence p. 73. Mustafa sent a message to III Corps Headquarters advising of his intentions to deploy and personally lead the 57th Regiment at around 7:00am ( Gallipoli – The Turkish Defence , p. 76).

Commander of the 57th Regiment was Major Hüseyin Avni. A photo is provided by Mesut Ayur in The Ottoman Defence Against the ANZAC Landing: 25 April 1915 on p. 122

Harvey Broadbent discusses the unexplained delay of approximately 90 minutes from 6:30am when the request to send one battalion was received to 7:55am when Mustafa Kemal led the 57th Regiment out of camp in Defending Gallipoli – The Turkish Story (p. 44-46). Broadbent cites telephone connection problems and the time to ready a whole division as possible reasons for the delay.

In Harvey Broadbent’s reference text Gallipoli – The Turkish Defence , Broadbent suggests that “It is possible that this readying of the whole division caused the ensuing ninety-minute delay in the 57th Regiment’s departure for the front. Part of the problem, according to Lieutenant Colonel Issetin, was the lack of a telephone connection to the coastal patrols from the 19th Division.” (p. 75). A translation of Mustafa Kemal’s order to send out a mounted patrol on the morning of 25 April includes the following: “And in order to establish contact between the 9th Division and our division, I sent second-lieutenant Necati Efendi together with four mounted troopers to the headquarters of this division.” (p. 384).